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LEGAL EDUCATION
Baby M, Lawyers, and Legal Education
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER*
TN response to Dean Manning, I want to express some concerns about
Xavoiding certain kinds of difficulties our students' future clients may
get into, and our ability to teach students how to help their clients
achieve what they want without exploiting others. While raising these
doubts, I nonetheless want to agree with him that this is precisely where
a great deal of our attention ought to go. My skepticism derives in part
from the belief that a great many of us have been trying to do just what
Dean Manning has told us to do, and we find it frustrating to hear re-
ports that our law graduates continue not to know very much about legal
institutions or about what it is that lawyers actually do, and how they
should and should not be doing it. Let me discuss a specific example
which has drawn many people's attention in order to show just how for-
midable is the task that lies ahead of us.
My example concerns the ways in which lawyers, law professors and
our whole society have been responding to the efforts of people to acquire
children by non-traditional means, by resort to artificial insemination
and to more complex medical techniques such as in-vitro fertilization or
embryo transfer. Of particular interest are the ways in which we have
attempted to cope with the problems posed by so-called surrogate parent-
ing. Most recently, our attention has been riveted upon the Baby M case.
The bitter controversy between the child's birth mother, Mary Beth
Whitehead, who repudiated her earlier determination to relinquish all
rights to her daughter, and the biological father, William Stern, who with
his wife Elizabeth, were the infant girl's intended social parents. The
problematic ruling of the trial judge ordering specific enforcement of the
surrogacy agreement, and the forthcoming decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court on Whitehead's appeal from the trial court's ruling.1
Surrogacy touches a number of discordant themes in our society,
our culture and our legal system. As a woman who deliberately conceives
and bears a child for the biological father and his spouse to raise, the
"4surrogate" gestator challenges our notions of what motherhood is all
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law.
1. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d. 1128 (1987), rev'd1 and remd'd., 109 N.J. 396,
537 A.2d 1227 (1988). In its refusal to enforce the Stern-Whitehead contract, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expressed the same concerns as are raised in this comment about the problematic
role played by attorneys in surrogacy arrangements. See text at 676-79 infra.
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about, and our legal tradition of conclusively attributing to a woman who
bears a child the legal status of "mother." Reactions to Mary Beth
Whitehead are contradictory. She evokes sympathy because she is over-
whelmed by the "natural" maternal feelings of not wanting to be sepa-
rated from her newborn child, and because to many people, she
symbolizes a broad class of indigent women who are vulnerable to be-
coming the mere uterine mechanisms for fulfilling the procreative desires
of much wealthier men and women. Yet, from others, she evokes criti-
cism for refusing to perform her contract and for basing her refusal on
her powerful maternal instincts. She is said to be too maternal, someone
who loved her child "too much" to abide by her agreement and let the
child go.
In sharp contrast to Mary Beth, Elizabeth Stern symbolizes the con-
temporary "liberated" woman, who like so many of her generation, de-
fers parenting while acquiring advanced degrees and pursuing a high-
powered career. She then finds her hopes for a family shattered by the
belated discovery that because of her age or some physical impediment,
she cannot-or should not-conceive or bear a child. Many people em-
pathize with Elizabeth, but others feel she got what she deserves for her
act of hubris in trying to "have it all," by combining traditional male and
female roles. Mary Beth evokes ambivalence because her self-esteem is so
bound up with being a mother; Elizabeth evokes ambivalence because
her self-esteem does not depend exclusively on being a mother.
Then there is William Stern, the biological and intended father,
whose desire to perpetuate his blood line is either praised as an expres-
sion of "natural" male instinct, or condemned as exploitative of women,
an exercise in "oppressive genetic patriarchy." Similarly, William's com-
mitment to parenting, his eagerness to be actively involved in raising and
nurturing his own child, is applauded by some as a welcome departure
from traditional male roles, and as encouraging the emergence of a more
gender-neutral concept of parenting. By contrast, others perceive his
commitment to parenting as suspect, as "unnatural" for a man.
The Baby M saga presents a struggle that is painful not just for the
specific individuals discussed here, but also for our legal system which is
one of the arenas where the struggle is being fought. It is within the legal
system that some prospects may exist for mitigating the harm already
done, especially to the innocent child whose legal status and physical
custody must be determined, and for avoiding these harms in other sur-
rogacy arrangements. Unfortunately, it is also within the legal system
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that we find some of the causes of the harms attendant upon the Baby M.
dispute.
What is often missing in the heated public discussions of the Baby M
and other surrogacy cases is an analysis of the role lawyers play in get-
ting the individual participants into these potentially painful situations.
In my view, the difficulties that arise in these arrangements are attributa-
ble in large measure to the failure of the attorneys who are instrumental
in putting them together to do what they were taught to do in law school,
or to the failure of those of us who teach law to offer appropriate instruc-
tion in the first instance on the scope of an attorney's responsibilities to
clients, and to unrepresented parties. In a number of respects, the lawyer-
ing of someone like Noel Keane, whose Infertility Center of New York
handled the Stern-Whitehead transaction, and who is involved in hun-
dreds of other pending surrogacy arrangements throughout the country,
leaves a great deal to be desired.
Whenever the performance of a contract may have severely detri-
mental consequences for one of the parties, special care is warranted to
bring those risks to the attention of the party who may be disadvantaged.
This is especially so when the potentially disadvantaged party has much
less education, money or familiarity with complex business transactions
than does the other party. In any situation calling for the waiver of fun-
damental rights-for example, waivers of claims against a spouse's es-
tate, ante-nuptial agreements, consents to a child's adoption, service as a
surrogate gestator - it is incumbent upon the lawyers who represent the
more vulnerable parties to apprise them what it is they are agreeing to
do, what it is they are agreeing to give up, and what consequences their
actions will have, not simply for women and men in general, but for them
in particular. If a woman's consent to serve as a surrogate gestator is not
based on her prior receipt of such information, it will be subject to chal-
lenge as being insufficiently "knowing" or "informed." Moreover, it is
incumbent upon the lawyers who represent the parties likely to gain the
most from the transaction to promote their client's substantive goals
without allowing them, either deliberately or inadvertently, to take unfair
advantage of the more vulnerable parties.
Keane's failures to exercise this requisite special care are manifest in
the circumstances surrounding the execution of Mary Beth's consent to
the contract whereby William would pay her for her agreement to be
artificially inseminated with his sperm, and to bear a child for him and
his wife to raise. Keane's Infertility Center did not make it clear to Mary
Beth that it was not her legal representative. It was plausible for her to
1988/89]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
perceive the Center as her agent, acting on her behalf in any negotiations
-with the Sterns. After all, the Center told Mary Beth that her application
was accepted soon after she replied to its advertisement for surrogates by
sending in her photograph and a brief statement of why she wanted to
bear a child for someone else. Although she later signed a disclaimer of
her right to independent counsel, she had at least one "consultation"
with a Center attorney about the legal ramifications of the surrogacy con-
tract. Even if she understood that the Center was not her lawyer or her
agent, Mary Beth may have believed the Center was a neutral broker
between herself and the Sterns, an impartial intermediary committed to
negotiating an agreement which fully served the interests of all the par-
ties. Substantial confusion about its actual role characterized the rela-
tionship between the Center and Mary Beth.
In fact, Mary Beth was an unrepresented party. Keane's Center was
not her lawyer, not her agent, not a neutral broker. The center was Wil-
liam's lawyer and his exclusive agent. It presented Mary Beth with a
standard form contract with nearly all the benefits running expressly or
implicitly to the Sterns, and virtually none, except for the payment for
the delivery and relinquishment of a live child, going to Mary Beth. Pur-
suant to his signed agreement with the Center, William was to pay the
Center a substantial non-refundable fee for handling all aspects of the
proposed surrogacy agreement on his behalf. The Center did not appreci-
ate--or denies-that as William's legal representative it owed him a duty
not to undermine the integrity of the process by which the surrogacy
agreement was negotiated and was to be performed. By failing to clarify
its role to Mary Beth, the Center took unfair advantage of her status as
the more vulnerable party and provided some of the grounds upon which
she can challenge the validity of her consent. The Center also failed to
fulfill its duty to its actual client, William Stern.
The Center's handling of the psychological evaluation of Mary Beth
illustrates how it took unfair advantage of her as an unrepresented party
and simultaneously, how it may have breached its duty to William. As
part of its routine screening of potential surrogates, the Center asked
Mary Beth to be interviewed by a clinical psychologist. The psycholo-
gist's report raised troubling questions about her capacity to give up an
infant, about her relationships with her two older children and her hus-
band, and about her propensity to act impetuously without reflecting on
the consequences of her behavior. The Center did not disclose the con-
tents of the psychological evaluations to Mary Beth. Without reaching
the question of whether the Center had an obligation to share informa-
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tion with her about the general risks associated with surrogacy, it is
surely possible to insist that it had an obligation to advise her of what it
had learned about the risks to her in particular. Because of the ambiguity
of the Center's role in relation to her, Mary Beth had a reasonable basis
for concluding that its silence meant that she was a suitable candidate for
surrogacy. The Center's failure to warn her about her own potential in-
ability to perform the surrogacy agreement makes it difficult to claim
that her consent was fully "informed." Perhaps even more unsettling
about Keane's Center, is that its failure to disclose the evaluation to the
Sterns, who paid for it and for whose benefit it was presumably under-
taken, suggests a callous, indeed a reckless disregard for the interests of
its own clients.
A more complete analysis of the conduct of lawyers involved in sur-
rogacy arrangements would entail discussion of the reciprocal relation-'
ships between the lawyers' behavior and the conflicting, typically
indeterminate legal principles governing surrogacy in most jurisdictions.
Also worthy of discussion is the extent to which the lawyers should be
held accountable for serving the interests of the children produced by
these arrangements. For this brief comment, however, I want to return to
an issue I alluded to at the start. What can law schools do to convince
our students that the kind of conduct described above is a disservice to
clients, may breach at least an implied fiduciary duty to unrepresented
and vulnerable parties faced with a loss of fundamental rights, and un-
dermines the integrity of the entire legal system?
We must certainly begin with what Dean Manning has reminded us
is the basic task of legal education: the teaching of analytical skills, intel-
lectual skepticism, appreciation of the power of language to shape human
relations, and attentiveness to process and procedure. But this is not suf-
ficient. We need also to connect this classical ethos of the legal profession
to a range of human sensitivities frorih which lawyers too often have been
aloof. This aloofness is characteristic not only of many law school gradu-
ates who enter corporate or other highly specialized law firms. It is also
notable among a substantial number of graduates of such law schools as
SUNY Buffalo or the University of Detroit, where I teach. Many of
these graduates end up in smaller firms with a diverse general practice, as
house counsel for a local business, as public employees, or as solo practi-
tioners. All must deal with a wide and unpredictable variety of clients
whose legal problems often present intricate, emotionally charged per-
sonal issues like those in the Whitehead-Stern transaction.
Not at all easy are the tasks of inculcating in our graduates compas-
1988/891
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sion for their clients and the capacity to help them articulate and pursue
their specific goals in ways that do not disregard the interests of others.
This kind of instruction must not be relegated to "practical" courses in
negotiating, counseling, mediating and the like, where it runs the risk of
becoming merely a lesson book in tactics for outmaneuvering opposing
counsel. In all of the courses we teach, and regardless of what teaching
methods we espouse, we must strive to increase our own and our stu-
dents' awareness that legal principles do not exist apart from the human
situations from which they are derived and to which they must be ap-
plied. Until this sensitivity becomes part of the culture of our law
schools, there is little hope that it shall find a prominent place in the
practice of law.
